Quarterly Commentary 2nd Quarter 2016

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Notwithstanding brief periods of weakness, both stock and bond markets have experienced remarkable success for more than seven years running. Through that period, those who have continued to highlight various dangers as reason for caution have been perceived as boys who cried “wolf”.  Copious quantities of newly printed money have flooded the equity and fixed income markets, keeping prices at elevated levels.  Those without much investment experience or historical perspective might view this phenomenon as normal or in some way the birthright of investors willing to accept market risk.  Nothing could be farther from the truth.

Informed investors must recognize the monumental bet they are making. (And I use the word “bet” advisedly.)  Positive returns remain possible over the next few years if the Fed and other world central bankers remain willing and able – two separate considerations – to keep stock and bond prices elevated.  Confidence in their price support has been a winning bet since 2009.  Traditionalists who believe that fundamental conditions will prevail, as they always ultimately have, see great danger in the extraordinary combination of slow economic growth, stagnant corporate earnings, extreme overvaluation, suppressed interest rates and unprecedented debt levels.  Reversion to historic means could produce destructive losses.  In my nearly half century in the investment industry, I have never before seen such a clear divergence between underlying fundamentals pointing in a negative direction and powerful central bankers aggressively promoting higher securities prices.

In a May article, “‘Normal’ Returns Are Unlikely In A Far From ‘Normal’ Environment,” I outlined the extraordinary economic and market conditions that make historically normal returns highly unlikely. By way of quick summary:

  1. Risk-free cash equivalents have provided an essentially zero return for the past eight years.
  2. Longer fixed income securities are at all-time low yields throughout most of the world. Over $11 trillion of securities now trade at negative yields.
  3. Common stocks are near all-time valuation highs, second only to the period around the dot.com mania peak, from which point stocks were trading more than 50 % lower nine years later.
  4. The US and world economies are extremely slow. The IMF, OECD and World Bank all continue to ratchet down their estimates of domestic and world economic growth. The US remains in its slowest recovery from recession in three-quarters of a century.
  5. Corporate profits in this country are essentially unchanged from four years ago, despite stock prices having progressed significantly higher. Earnings and revenue estimates have been far too optimistic for several years.
  6. Debt levels in the US and around most of the world are extreme and dangerous. Current debt levels are far above levels that have led to significantly below normal economic growth throughout history.

Access the article here for a fuller exposition of each of these points.

Having appraised this confluence of precarious conditions, two of the greatest living investors have turned decisively bearish. Stanley Druckenmiller, whose hedge fund returned 30% per year for a quarter of a century before being closed to the public, indicated recently his belief that investors should sell all stocks and own gold.  George Soros, one of the legendary early hedge fund operators, recently returned to money management from philanthropy.  Soros believes that opportunities on the short side are sufficiently attractive to draw him back to his earlier extremely profitable pursuit.  He also expressed his currency preference to be gold.  In addition, just weeks ago, Goldman Sachs did the unthinkable for a major investment firm, saying that it could see no reason to own stocks.  Druckenmiller, Soros and Goldman Sachs could all be wrong, but, at the very least, it should be a sobering consideration that they all see great risk in the stock market.

Reversion to the mean has been a process that has characterized securities markets throughout history. At current levels of overvaluation, it is logical to expect that significant price declines may realign stock and bond prices with underlying fundamentals.  There is, however, another long-appreciated aphorism, widely attributed to John Maynard Keynes: Markets can stay irrational longer than you can stay solvent.  In other words, while markets will almost certainly mean revert, they might not do it on your timetable.  That, again, frames the bet investors must make: Do you bet on historically normal mean reversion, leading to a highly defensive stance, or do you bet on a continuation of central bankers’ successful exercise of experimental monetary policies?

Factors in any risk-assumption analysis are not just the probability of one outcome or another but also the consequence flowing from each alternative. With interest rates at multi-century lows, the potential return from fixed income is not only severely limited, there is a possibility of substantial losses if interest rates should rise rapidly.  For all the factors profiled earlier, while stocks could still advance, it is highly unlikely that they will make dramatic gains.  On the other hand, having declined by 50% or more twice already in the past 16 years, equities could repeat such aggressive bear market behavior if investor confidence in central bankers should wane.

With upside potential limited and downside risks substantial, maintaining traditional portfolio allocations and the widely followed buy and hold approach is likely a prescription for substantial portfolio damage in the years ahead. Organizations and individuals with little potential to replace lost capital should be particularly careful about betting on continuing central bank success.


“Normal” Returns Are Unlikely In A Far From “Normal” Environment

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Almost all investors have at least a general familiarity with the long-term performance record of stocks, bonds and cash equivalents. Over the 90-year span from the end of 1925 to year-end 2015, common stocks provided an average annual total return of 10.0%; Intermediate U.S. Government Bonds 5.3%; and risk-free U.S. Treasury Bills 3.5%.  All this transpired in an environment marked by an average inflation rate of 2.9% per year.  Substituting corporate bonds or long-term U.S. Governments would increase the volatility of fixed income returns but do little to change the 5.3% long-term return provided by Intermediate U.S. Governments.  Deducting inflation reduces average real returns to 0.6% for cash equivalents, 2.4% for bonds and 7.1% for stocks over the 90 years studied.

If we could count on such average returns over any upcoming five- or ten-year period, portfolio construction would be decisively simpler. Over the decades, however, history has taught us repeatedly that many factors conspire to make decision-making very difficult.  Performance of the major asset classes frequently varies dramatically from long-term averages, occasionally for extended periods of time.

Most investors are astounded to learn that risk-free cash equivalents have outperformed both stocks and bonds for several very long periods of time. Over more than half of the twentieth century in three distinct stretches (1903-20; 1929-49; 1966-82), unmanaged risk-free cash equivalents outperformed common stocks.  And for more than 40 years from the early-1940s through the early-1980s, cash equivalents also outperformed a typical broadly diversified bond portfolio.

Unfortunately, no one is kind enough to ring a bell announcing the inception of those lengthy periods of stock and bond underperformance. We have to examine available evidence to determine whether we should expect historically “normal” returns or, perhaps, something very different.  Evaluating today’s conditions, we see little that looks “normal”.

Thanks to the Federal Reserve, risk-free return has been essentially non-existent for eight years, robbing the elderly retired of any return if they were unable or unwilling to accept the investment risk of other asset categories. This is not only not “normal”, but unprecedented, with the yield below even the minimal risk-free returns of the Great Depression.

The yields on longer fixed income securities are not appreciably better, resting at or near all-time lows throughout most of the world. Many have absurdly descended into negative territory, thanks again to the geniuses at work in a number of central banks.  At such levels, yield is non-existent, profit potential severely limited and risk levels extremely high.  Nothing “normal” here.

Common stocks are currently priced near all-time valuation highs. A composite of commonly employed valuation measures (stock market capitalization relative to the size of the economy, price-to-dividends, price-to-book value, price-to-earnings, price-to-sales and price-to-cash flow) is higher than ever before in U.S. history but for the period immediately around the dot.com mania at the turn of the century.  From that price peak, stock prices were more than 50% lower nine years later.  Nobel Prize winner Robert Shiller’s research, covering the years since 1881, demonstrates clearly that far below average returns consistently follow periods of far above average valuations.  From current levels of valuation, “normal” real annual returns over the next decade or more are likely to be either negative or low single digit positive.  If history repeats, that period is also likely to encompass at least one major stock market decline, which could be similar to the two that we have experienced so far in the still young twenty-first century.  “Normal” returns from such conditions are likely to be very different from the 90-year “normal”.

The U.S. and world economies are in danger of far below normal progress in the years ahead. The international Monetary Fund, the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and the World Bank have for several years been reducing their estimates of economic growth worldwide.  That growth slowdown has been more persistent and far more severe than economists have anticipated, despite the most aggressive monetary stimulus in history.  Notwithstanding some recent growth, the U.S. is still experiencing its slowest recovery from recession in more than three-quarters of a century.  Reflecting a drying up of global demand, global exports have recently declined year over year, a condition occurring only during U.S. recessions in the past quarter century.  Whether a recession is pending or not, it is likely that we continue to face a far below “normal” economic environment.

Over many decades, common stock prices and corporate earnings have grown at roughly the same rate, although not always in lock step. While stock prices have continued to climb, corporate profits are approximately unchanged over the past three years–far below a “normal” rate of growth.  Stock prices have clearly outrun corporate earnings.  Earnings and revenue guidance for the period immediately ahead is tepid at best.

The most serious ab-“normal” condition facing investors and society in general is the extreme and dangerous level of debt built up both domestically and internationally. In their attempts to rescue the U.S. and major world economies from the financial crisis and to sustain growth during the lethargic recovery, central bankers have created unprecedented levels of debt.  In This Time Is Different, Carmen Reinhart and Ken Rogoff chronicle in great detail how excessive debt levels have led to extended periods of far below “normal” economic growth over many centuries in countries throughout the world.  Today’s levels of debt relative to the size of most major countries’ economies are well beyond the danger points outlined in Reinhart and Rogoff’s research.  And history’s greatest stock market declines have almost invariably unfolded soon after a period of extreme debt buildup.

What then are the prospects for securities over the next few years? Risk-free cash equivalents are likely to provide little over zero for some time to come if central bankers retain control.  The singular advantage to cash, however, is liquidity, which buys the investor the option to take advantage of occasional dramatic price declines in other asset classes.

With yields on longer fixed income securities near historic lows, there is far more room above current levels than below. To make more than the meager coupon on today’s bonds and notes, yields have to go even lower, and investors have to make a timely sale at those lower yields.  The far more likely prospect of higher rates in the years ahead will lead to a loss of principal value–a bad risk/reward equation.

Despite very slow economic growth, stagnant corporate earnings and excessive valuations, common stock prices could still move higher if investors retain confidence in the willingness and ability of our Fed and other central bankers to support the securities markets. While possible, such a scenario flies in the face of what is “normal” with today’s conditions.  Add the issue of unprecedented levels of domestic and worldwide debt, and normal corrective price moves could be powerfully magnified.

Short-term traders may be able to navigate such turbulent waters, although very few hedge funds have done that successfully in recent years. Buy and hold investors face particularly difficult prospects.  It is not inconceivable that a reversion to “normal” valuations could cut stock prices in half or more, as has happened twice since year 2000.

Many buy and hold investors expect to survive such episodes, painful as they may be, by just staying the course. After all, that’s been a successful formula in this country during today’s investors’ lifetimes.  It may be instructive, however, to look to Japan for cautionary guidance.  At the end of the 1980s, the Japanese stock market was the biggest in the world.  It had been rising inexorably through that decade, as Japan had come to dominate the automotive and electronics industries.  Japan appeared to have the new industrial paradigm.  As the excesses of their prior long strong cycle began to unwind, however, stock prices began to fall.  So ab-“normal” were conditions that prices ultimately declined about 80% and today, more than a quarter century later, remain more than 50% below the 1989 peak.  No one could have foreseen such an outcome when the Japanese market was near its top.

The fixed income portion of portfolios could simultaneously be damaged severely if interest rates should revert to historically “normal” levels.  Should inflation rates also return to “normal”, the purchasing power of bond proceeds at maturity would be markedly compromised.

There is no easy pathway to investment success in the years immediately ahead. As long as central bankers retain control, traditional approaches may continue to provide some success.  Should current rates, valuations and conditions revert to historically “normal” levels, however, traditional approaches may be severely punished.  In such an environment, avoiding major losses may become as important as seeking gains.  Even very low-return cash equivalents may come to play a valuable role in preserving assets so they may be productively deployed at more attractive future valuations.  In both equity and fixed income areas, proven strategic approaches are likely to be far more productive than a traditionally allocated buy and hold approach.  Retirees or organizations with largely irreplaceable capital should be particularly risk-averse.  There is very little “normal” in the current environment.

Thomas J. Feeney is Managing Director and Chief Investment Officer of Mission Management & Trust Co., Tucson, Arizona.


Quarterly Commentary 1st Quarter 2016

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The historic volatility evident since mid-2014 was even more extreme in this year’s first quarter. The dramatic market decline in last year’s third quarter was followed by an equally dramatic fourth quarter rally.  An almost identical decline and rally were compressed into the first three months of 2016.  Following the worst start to a year in U.S. stock market history, Fed Chair Janet Yellen gave stock prices at least a temporary boost when she surprised markets by not hiking interest rates at the Fed’s January meeting.  Her dovish tone gave investors hope that the Fed would still be supportive in the months ahead.  The brief late-January rally quickly faded, however, and prices retreated to a new low, breaking a potentially important support area on February 11.  Conspiracy theorists were given ammunition when rumors surfaced within ten minutes of the breakdown that the OPEC countries were preparing to meet to discuss cutting back oil production.  Oil prices immediately rallied, and stock prices followed.  Prices rallied into the end of the quarter, recovering all of the January – February decline, closing with a slight gain.

Late in the quarter, further dovish comments by Fed Chair Yellen as well as additional stimulative central bank actions in Europe and Asia were designed to boost economies and support stock and bond prices. They succeeded on the bond side, but stocks have shown far less enthusiasm in recent weeks in the US and throughout most of the world.  Despite extremely aggressive stimulus, Japan is a prime example of central bank ineffectiveness, with the Nikkei down about 11% year-to-date as this is written.  Despite an aggressive negative interest rate policy by the European Central Bank, European stock indexes declined an average7.7% in the first quarter.  Many opponents of central bankers’ experimental monetary policies are now arguing that such stimulative strategies have reached the limits of their effectiveness and may now, in fact, have become counterproductive.

Former Fed Chairman Alan Greenspan made a remarkable confession last week, saying: “Monetary policy is largely economic forecasting. And our ability to forecast is significantly limited.”  Bill King, who writes The King Report, had a classic response: “Nowwww he tells us that the Fed is Mr. Magoo when forecasting!”  I have written two articles in the past several weeks pointing out the absolute absurdity of granting the Fed, comprised entirely of academics and regulators, the power to effectively orchestrate the US economy.  (See http://www.missiontrust.com/blog/2016/03/reduce-the-feds-mandate/ and http://www.missiontrust.com/blog/2016/03/wheres-the-outrage/.) Also over the past several weeks the Organisation for Economic Co-operation and Development, the International Monetary Fund and the World Trade Organization all continued their now longstanding pattern of dropping earlier estimates of world GDP growth.  Their average estimate is now about 3% for 2016, essentially a recessionary level in much of the world.  In this country, the Atlanta Fed’s most recent estimate of first quarter US GDP growth is barely above zero, having been sharply reduced in recent weeks.  Reflecting slowing global growth, global corporate profits have been declining since 2011(according to Bloomberg) and are today well below their 2007 peak levels.  In the US, “as reported” profits for the S&P 500 are at 2012’s level, although stock prices have risen substantially over that same timespan, thanks to central bank support.

Wall Street remains silent about an imminent recession either domestically or globally. It is noteworthy, however, that over the past 45 years, Wall Street has forecast none of the past seven US recessions.  Wall Street isn’t likely to predict recessions, because it’s just not good for business.  One very telling statistic, however, that argues strongly for a global slowdown is the pronounced decline in global exports.  Exports are slowing because global demand has dried up.  Over the past quarter of a century, export growth has declined year-over-year only during recessions.

The unprecedented global central bank actions have so distorted normalcy that world interest rates in this cycle have descended to lows seen only once before, in the late-1500s. Short-term rates in Europe and Japan have been pushed into negative territory.  In this country, they are barely positive.  Thirteen European countries’ fixed income securities have negative yields to maturities out beyond a year, with Germany and the Netherlands negative out to eight years and Switzerland out to 15.  Owners of more than $7 trillion worth of securities have decided that paying those governments to hold their money is more attractive than all other alternatives– a remarkable distortion of everything we know about investments.  Some market commentators refer to today’s fixed income securities as “return-free risk.”  In the US, with the 10-Year Treasury Note at 1.8% as I write, it would take a very small increase in yield to produce a negative total return for a year or more.  While yields could always go lower, the risk/reward equation at these yields is extremely unattractive.

The credit quality of non-government loans is increasingly being called into question. According to The Wall Street Journal, energy company loans in danger of default are expected to top 50% this year at several major banks.  And J.D. Power estimates that the delinquency rate on subprime auto loans will hit 17.5% this year, approaching the 19.6% peak reached just before the financial crisis in 2007.  Bonds are hardly an attractive safe haven in the current environment.

Because of central bank actions, today’s debt excesses around the world are the most severe in history. In this country, equity valuations are at their historical highs but for the dot.com bubble at the turn of the century, from which point stock prices were more than 50% lower nine years later.  Over the decades, there has been a very clear negative relationship between valuations at the time stocks are purchased and subsequent returns.  With valuations currently stretched near all-time highs, stocks will be swimming against the historic tides in the years ahead.

Aldous Huxley famously observed: “Facts do not cease to exist because they are ignored.” The facts are that debt and equity valuations remain at dangerous extremes, having been ignored for years.  Instead, trust has been placed in government’s willingness and ability to keep stock prices elevated.  So far, over this market cycle, that trust has been well placed.  Investors are still faced, however, with the dilemma of whether to bet on a continuing divergence between equity prices and underlying fundamentals or to expect market prices to revert toward historic fundamental norms.  For all but relatively short-term traders, we strongly suggest the latter alternative.  It is important to recognize that virtually no investors get to keep what they have at market highs, but rather what still remains at market lows.  And given how overextended this market is after seven years of powerful government support, we fully expect there will be opportunities to become more aggressive in equities in the quarters and years ahead at lower prices—possibly substantially lower.





Reduce the Fed’s Mandate

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Why do we refuse to call absurdity absurd? Meeting after meeting, news conference after news conference, it becomes increasingly apparent that we have conferred on the Fed Chair the role of economic and securities market orchestrator.  Markets typically tip-toe into Fed announcements only to explode into paroxysms of volume as algos move prices violently – often in alternating directions – in the initial moments following each announcement.  The ultimate market direction is dictated by the Fed’s dovish or hawkish tone relative to the market’s expectation leading into the meeting.  Imagine how much more orderly and intelligent it would be to have a rule-based decision-making formula that investors could monitor as new data unfold.

Because the Fed’s Congressionally-conferred mandate extends beyond currency stabilization to include maximizing employment, Fed members now scan the world for economic, monetary and securities market data, all of which now seem relevant in their decision-making process. In this week’s speech to the Economic Club of New York, Fed Chair Yellen relied heavily on global uncertainties as rationale for large doses of caution in considering future interest rate increases.

The Fed’s long history is replete with flawed judgments and policy moves. For years, forecasts of the current Fed have been far off the mark on economic growth and interest rates.  Off past performance, why would we expect this group of academics and regulators to have greater insight into domestic and world economic prospects than the broad universe of business people and investors?  It flies in the face of all logic to allow Chair Yellen and any small band of academics and regulators to wield the power that the Fed holds over domestic and world economies and markets.  Congress must take that giant club out of the Fed’s hands by reducing its mandate.

Since the general public and its representatives in Congress don’t understand this highly complex policy-making process, they vest power in a perceived wise person. They fail to recognize that any Fed Chair is less like Solomon and more like the wizard behind the curtain.

Either the Fed doesn’t appreciate the full effects of its decisions and actions, or it is simply satisfied with having rewarded Wall Street, though not Main Street. Whatever benefits accrued from history’s most generous monetary experiment have come at the expense of a generation of elderly retired who have had to choose between spending down life savings or risking those assets in historically overvalued securities.  The final chapter on how that unfortunate generation’s retirement will play out has almost certainly not been written.

Far greater pain likely lies ahead, perhaps to be borne primarily by generations which have had no role in approving the Fed’s decisions. Monumental debt loads, like today’s, have throughout history led to greatly inhibited economic growth for extended spans of years.  And many of history’s greatest securities market declines have accompanied such periods of economic lethargy.

Our unwillingness to confront the absurdity of allowing a few academics and regulators to orchestrate domestic and world economies is allowing the pain to continue for the elderly retired and to increase for future generations that will almost certainly inherit unprecedented debt burdens. We are allowing Janet Yellen to dig us deeper into a destructive dungeon of debt.  Congress and the general citizenry must make their voices heard in opposition.

Congress should immediately set about reducing the Fed’s current dual mandate to a single mandate of stabilizing the currency. Ideally, within that mandate, Fed decision-making would be formally rule-based rather than, as today, with each Fed voting member formulating his or her own non-binding and often fluctuating rules.

Let’s recognize the absurdity of the current arrangement in which any Fed Chair, essentially without veto, plays the largest single role in orchestrating the world economy.

Thomas J. Feeney is Managing Director and Chief Investment Officer of Mission Management & Trust Co., Tucson, Arizona.

For a related analysis of the inappropriate scope of Fed power, please see Tom’s immediately prior blog post “Where’s the Outrage?”.


Where’s The Outrage?

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In 1976’s Network, Howard Beale famously yelled: “I’m mad as hell, and I’m not going to take this anymore!”

The rise of Donald Trump and Bernie Sanders testifies powerfully to the anger felt by large segments of the American population. Tragically, that anger does not extend to the ascension of the Federal Reserve as orchestrator of the U.S. economy, despite no public approval of such a “third mandate.”

The Fed’s assumption of its expanded role displays a remarkable lack of humility given the long and checkered track record of that body’s errors of omission and commission. In recent months, regional Fed presidents Charles Evans and James Bullard have highlighted seriously flawed Fed forecasts.  In almost any other context, such frequent failings would lead affected constituencies to reduce a body’s decision-making authority.  Remarkably, just the opposite has occurred over the past several years with respect to the Fed and central bankers around the world.

To solve problems brought on by excessive debt, central bankers have conducted the greatest monetary experiment in history. They have attempted and continue to attempt to solve those problems with unprecedented amounts of new debt.  While it sounds simplistic, it is a very apt analogy to compare that solution to trying to cure a hangover with more “hair of the dog.”  It flies in the face of all logic.

Likely because monetary economics is a highly complex study, the general public and their representatives in Congress have little understanding even of its broad strokes, much less its intricacies. As a result, there has been only mild opposition by those most impacted today – a generation of retirees who have so far been able to earn no risk-free return for half an expected retirement span.  And, of course, there has been no objection from future generations who will inherit the monumental debt levels we have generated to paper over problems of our own creation.  If we actually understood the problem, who among us would deliberately improve our own wellbeing and demand that our children, grandchildren, even great grandchildren pay the bill?  So we silently allow central bankers to conduct what they themselves characterize as experimental monetary policies.  But this is not a small experiment.  Should the world’s monumental debt burdens unravel in an uncontrolled fashion, central bankers will be seen to have bet the world’s economy and the wellbeing of generations on little tested and certainly unproven policies.

Who are these people to whom we have defaulted such power? They are, virtually without exception, academics and regulators.  By all appearances, each is intelligent, well-intentioned and respected in his or her field.  But they are academics and regulators, unsullied by any practical experience in running even a single significant business, much less the world’s largest economy.  Regardless of their academic credentials, few, if any, would qualify for senior management roles in major domestic or international corporations.  Individual Fed members could certainly be blended with experienced business people to comprise capable boards.  Shareholders of any large corporation, however, would have every reason to be appalled by a board restricted solely to Federal Reserve Board members.  Where’s the real world experience, the appreciation of the profit and loss consequences of regular decision making?  Where’s the breadth of experience required to appreciate the effects of a company’s actions on both its customers and on the broader citizenry its actions affect?  Their academic and regulatory pursuits leave them remarkably sheltered from a real world appreciation of the breadth of the effects they create.  Yet we have allowed them to assume far more extensive power than exists in even the world’s most prestigious corporate or non-profit boards.  It can only be from ignorance or from a deplorable lack of concern that we as a citizenry have permitted central bankers to acquire such a powerful role in picking society’s winners and losers.  The mandate they have assumed is entirely too large.

In fact, the dual mandate given the Fed by Congress is responsible for the current overreach. Virtually anything unfolding in the domestic or international economies arguably affects domestic employment.  Consequently, the mandate to maximize employment effectively charges the Fed with monitoring and responding to massive numbers of potentially critical variables.  Recent quotes from several Fed members make it clear that monitoring and responding to the world’s financial markets falls well within the Fed’s perceived purview.

Wall Street is nothing if not ingenious and capable of creating its preferred market picture. In an era of rampant spoofing and bluffing, it’s hardly a stretch to expect self-interested, financial megacorps to paint the picture they want the Fed to perceive leading up to important central bank decisions.  When experienced investment pros misread market signals with some regularity, what are the odds that a group of academics and regulators are going to read them accurately?  At best, it’s an exercise fraught with hazard.  We’re asking Fed members to make decisions far beyond their areas of experience and competence.

Allowing the Fed to wield the power it now has is also creating massive stock market distortions. So much market reaction flows from Fed proclamations that analysts spend an inordinate amount of time attempting to interpret the slightest variations in language or attitude of Fed voting members.  For many strategists this has become even more important than the analysis of underlying fundamental conditions.  That dynamic becomes blatantly obvious whenever we see markets surge on an announcement of disappointing economic news, as the prospect for more stimulus increases–a clear distortion of traditional free markets.

In recent years, Fed Chairs Bernanke and Yellen have gone to great lengths to promote the idea of Fed transparency. At the same time, we are subjected to Fed members repeatedly performing like traditional two-handed economists with the apparent intent of keeping upcoming decisions unclear.  A rule-based system to determine monetary policy would certainly be preferable to the frequently flawed Chair-led decisions heavily influenced by personal perceptions and biases.  The arguments against relying on a rule-based system typically involve pointing out how such a system would have led to an arguably unacceptable monetary position in one or more instances– as if the existing system itself has not placed the country in an extremely dangerous position.  If a rule-based system appears imperfect, improve the rules.  Clearly, each voting member of the Fed relies on his or her own set of rules in making monetary decisions.  They are not, however, publicly known, so we are left to speculate on how voters, especially the Chair, will make their decisions.  The securities markets would be far better served if analysts knew the rules on which monetary decisions would be based.  Strategists could abandon the psychological analysis of voting members and their probable decision-making patterns and return to an analysis of how the data align.

If we are not to turn to a formularized rule-based monetary system, we need to expand the influence of the many constituencies affected by monetary decisions. Obviously, any decision-maker would need a strong background in monetary economics.   Additionally, it’s only fair that they represent the many segments of society that will be impacted by those decisions: large and small businesses, employees, elderly retired, investors, non-profits.  The current Fed has much too broad a mandate and is woefully unqualified to pursue the many objectives on its plate.

Notwithstanding the best of intentions, the Fed in recent years has bet America’s future on a flawed (now failed) experimental monetary policy. Until we speak up loudly, we remain at risk of their experiments further decimating the future economic prospects of our nation and coming generations.

Difficult and confusing as this subject is, Congress needs to step up now and rein in Fed power. It’s important for all of us to recognize that this king wears no clothes.


Markets At A Crossroad

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In a September 8, 2015 blog, I indicated my strong belief that a major worldwide bear market had begun.  At the recent February 11 lows, the S&P 500 was about 15% below its May and July 2015 highs.  Most foreign markets had suffered more significant declines.  The dangerous conditions outlined in that earlier blog remain major intermediate and long-term concerns.

One of the weakest beginnings to a new year ever turned short-term investor sentiment very negative.  At extremes, sentiment measures can be excellent contrary indicators.  In a bear market, sentiment can remain pessimistic far longer than during bull market corrections, but significant pessimism often marks at least a short-term market bottom.  Notwithstanding numerous ongoing negative conditions, we must now remain alert to see whether stock prices need to rise appreciably to relieve excess negative sentiment.  A telling point is likely to be whether stock prices can remain above their February 11 lows (about 1810 on the S&P 500 and 15,500 on the Dow Jones Industrials).  Remaining above those levels could rekindle more bullish feelings for a while, even leading to a test of former highs.  On the other hand, a break below the February 11 lows could unleash torrents of selling as investors come to believe that central bank rescue efforts have become ineffective.  Either way, the year ahead is likely to be extremely volatile with the potential for a market, economic, political or military event decimating longer-term investor confidence and leading to a persistent, destructive market decline.


Quarterly Commentary 4th Quarter 2015

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2015 disappointed almost all investors. At the start of the year, there was unanimity among strategists from all major investment firms that the Fed-supported stock market rally would continue. It did not, as the average U.S. stock declined and at year-end was 24% below its 52-week high. The strength in a small number of institutional favorites kept the major equity indexes from similar declines. In fact, while the total return on the Dow Jones Industrials was negative, a 2% dividend return on the S&P 500 lifted that index out of the negative column to a total return just above 1%. Risk-free cash equivalents continued to provide no return, and bonds were mixed with the broadly followed Barclays Aggregate Bond Index registering a total return of 0.55%. At the lower end of the quality spectrum, high yield bonds lost 4% for the year.

Such nondescript returns masked an unprecedented level of volatility. Throughout the year, there were repeated violent market swings with no lasting trends developing. Hedge funds had a particularly difficult time – with some of the most successful over the past few years dropping by 20% or more. Warren Buffett’s normally profitable Berkshire Hathaway Corporation declined by 12%.

As we begin 2016, investment strategists and economists are once again convinced that stocks and the economy are primed for a positive year. We disagree. About four months ago, I wrote a blog explaining why Mission believed that a major bear market had begun. Subsequent events have done nothing to dampen that conviction. Let me update the major factors that led to that belief.

Even after the worst first week of a new year in U.S. stock market history, valuations remain higher than ever before but for the months surrounding 2000’s dot.com peak. Data stretching back more than a century make the point that returns for the years following periods of significant overvaluation tend to be much weaker than average. It has been in such time spans that the market’s most destructive declines have unfolded.

The vast majority of U.S. stocks are trading below their 50- and 200-day moving averages, showing that they are trending down. Of the 46 world markets that we monitor, only five are trading above their 200-day moving averages and only three above their 50-day.

Even on most rally days, more stocks are reaching 52-week lows than 52-week highs. The market’s internal deterioration can be seen clearly in statistics compiled by Lowry Research Corporation, an institution with an 88-year history of highly respected research. In twelve months through December 30, the percentage of stocks within 2% of their 52-week highs declined significantly: Large caps from 27.1% to 17.45%; Mid caps from 23.24% to 15.53%; and Small caps from 14.38% to 3.33%. Over the same time period, the percentage of stocks down from their 52-week highs by 20% or more increased dramatically: Large caps from 8.87% to 19.81%; Mid caps from 18.06% to 34.36%; and Small caps from 39.05% to 61.71%. These statistics are not consistent with a healthy market.

This internal deterioration took place while our Federal Reserve and other major central banks were flooding their respective economies and markets with historic amounts of monetary stimulus. The European Central Bank and the Bank of Japan have pledged to continue that torrent of new money, but the Fed has begun a belated process of “normalization”. Interest rates have been nudged above the zero bound for the first time in years, and the essentially free new money from quantitative easing will be missing in 2016. We can only speculate how the economy and markets will behave without that familiar stimulus.

In a process that began over two years ago, volume going into rising stocks has deteriorated steadily relative to volume going into declining stocks. In the second half of 2015, the cumulative volume total going into declining stocks surged above the volume going into advancing stocks. As measured by Ned Davis Research since 1981, the S&P 500 has on average declined when that condition has prevailed, and the index has performed an annualized 13.5% worse than when advancing volume has dominated.

For most of the past two years, the yield on lower quality debt has been rising notably– both absolutely and relative to U.S. Treasuries. That trend has preceded some of history’s most severe stock market declines.

Those who interpret Dow Theory announced a bearish signal in August when both the Dow Industrials and Transports descended below their October 2014 lows. The precipitous market decline in 2016’s first week has brought the Transports to a new low not yet confirmed by the Industrials.

Weakness in technical conditions is not alone in sounding an alarm. Fundamental conditions, as well, continue to deteriorate. Notwithstanding consistently optimistic forecasts from investment bankers and brokerage firms, worldwide growth remains weak. The International Monetary Fund (IMF), the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) and, most recently, the World Bank have all once again dropped their estimates for both U.S. and world growth. IMF head Christine Lagarde last week forecast 2016 global growth to be “disappointing and uneven.”

China’s growth continues to slow, and smaller emerging economies are increasingly distressed by the strengthening U.S. dollar. After China’s surprise devaluation of the yuan, an increasing number of countries are likely to be motivated to weaken their currencies to maintain or improve their export potential. Aggressive currency wars are possible as countries fight to avoid recession. When last common, such currency wars contributed greatly to the length and depth of the 1930s’ worldwide depression.

In the U.S., corporate earnings declined in 2015 and are at approximately the same level as at the end of 2013. With no net earnings growth for two years and the most optimistic forecasts projecting uncertain growth in 2016, valuations not far below all-time highs make no sense.

Weak technicals and fundamentals by themselves pose significant dangers. Mix them into an environment marked by the highest debt levels in history throughout most of the world, and the risk of severe and rapid market price declines is high.

Standing guard against such an outcome are Janet Yellin, Mario Draghi and central bankers worldwide. For several years, they have stepped into the breach whenever significant price declines have threatened.

History argues strongly, however, that central bankers can prevail over weak fundamental conditions only so long. Markets eventually adjust to fundamental levels, and the adjustment can be abrupt if, as now, prices have diverged dramatically from underlying fundamentals.

We continue to caution investors against being lulled into a state of complacency by apparent central bank control over market prices. In past communications, we have highlighted two striking 2015 examples of the power of markets ripping control from the best efforts of governments. The highly respected Swiss National Bank (SNB) saw the euro diverge from the franc by 38% in minutes when the SNB dropped its long-held peg between the currencies. Far less respected Chinese monetary authorities were shocked when stock prices plummeted by 45% in weeks despite significant governmental support for markets. More surprises are likely in 2016.



Quarterly Commentary 3rd Quarter 2015

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The vast majority of U.S. stocks began to form a broad, rolling top back in November 2014. Historic price volatility has marked the months since then, as the world’s major central bankers have intervened with verbal or monetary support whenever market prices threatened an uncomfortable decline. Slowing economic fundamentals, however, limited subsequent rallies to the area of prior trading ranges. The S&P 500 peaked in May at 2134. In mid-August, prices broke support dramatically with the widely watched Dow Jones Industrials plummeting by more than 2200 points in just four trading sessions, taking prices back to the levels of May 2013. More frenetic volatility characterized the remainder of the quarter, with the S&P 500 shedding 6.4% over the full three-month period and registering a 5.3% loss for the year-to-date.

Notwithstanding still abundant central bank stimulus, most world markets have been weaker than those in the U.S. Even after the rally that opened the fourth quarter, the vast majority of world markets remain down for the year and virtually all are trading beneath their 200-day moving averages. It was striking to note at quarter-end that the MSCI All Country World Index (excluding the U.S.) was at the same level as in March 2000, despite the powerful market rally since 2009. Longstanding Mission clients may well remember our counsel as we entered the new century that we were likely entering a long weak cycle that could last for two decades. It remains highly likely that the U.S. and the rest of the world will ultimately see stock prices below their March 2000 levels before this long weak cycle ends.

In my September 8 blog (Worldwide Bear Market? Probably), I outlined numerous reasons why it is probable that a significant bear market has begun. Fundamental as well as technical conditions continue to point to the same conclusion.

The domestic and world economies are weak and weakening. The Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development and the International Monetary Fund have both recently lowered their U.S. and global economic forecasts. The IMF believes there to be a 50% chance of global growth declining below 3% next year – “equivalent to a global recession.” Citigroup’s research team raised the odds of such a global recession to 55%. Former Treasury Secretary and ex-presidential economic advisor Larry Summers describes the danger facing the global economy as more severe than at any time since the Lehman Brothers bankruptcy in 2008. He makes his case for no near-term rate rise by stating that many industrialized economies are barely running above stall speed and can ill afford a negative global shock. He sees monetary policymakers lacking the tools to respond if a recession were to unfold.

The weak macro picture is compounded by erosion at the micro level as well. Third quarter corporate earnings are expected to decline year over year, and early reporting companies are offering weak forward guidance. Goldman Sachs recently warned that deterioration of balance sheet health is “increasingly alarming” and will only worsen if earnings growth continues to stall amid a global economic slowdown. According to Bloomberg, corporations have loaded up on debt. In the aggregate they owe more interest than ever before, with interest coverage at its lowest since 2009. Major corporations such as Hewlett Packard, Deutsche Bank, Caterpillar and Halliburton have all recently announced intentions to lay off many thousands of employees. Such announcements are likely to multiply.

Since the end of the 1990’s, I have pointed to excessive debt as the primary threat to the domestic and world economies. The debt problem is so severe that seven years of unprecedented central bank stimulus has failed to promote growth even approximating the historic norm. Growth of real per capita U.S. GDP is less than half the normal growth over the past two centuries. To promote even that meager result, the Fed has built a balance sheet debt mountain more than four times what it was just seven years ago. Following the Fed’s lead, other central bankers have similarly attempted to boost their economies on the back of more debt. In the last two decades, overall worldwide debt has grown from $40 trillion in 1995 to $200 trillion last year, while global GDP grew by a far more modest $45 trillion over the same years. Worldwide debt now far exceeds the 2007 crisis level. As became clear in the 1920’s and 1930’s, when all major economies face severe debt overhangs, no single country can serve as the world’s engine of growth. It’s an environment that spawned destructive currency wars in the 1930’s, and we are seeing the early signs of such beggar-thy-neighbor policies today. History demonstrates clearly that there is no easy escape from extreme debt levels.

All debt, of course, is not created equal. In a zero interest rate environment, desperate investors hunt far and wide for yield. In recent years, vast amounts of relatively free borrowed money found its way into emerging economies. When money is essentially free, massive misallocations are likely with serious mispricing of risk assets. Emerging markets have experienced huge asset inflation despite commodity disinflation. With the prospect of rising U.S. interest rates making those investments more expensive, hundreds of billions of dollars have been fleeing those emerging economies in recent months. Very likely, banks have lent trillions that will never be repaid. Defaulted loans obviously penalize both debtors and creditors, and widespread defaults can spiral into a worldwide crisis.

Further complicating life for investors is the second factor that contributed greatly to both of this century’s stock market crashes – extreme overvaluation. TV’s talking heads continually refer to current valuation levels as “fair” or “not too bad.” While valuations are not as extreme as those of the dot.com mania at the turn of the century, any honest evaluation of a broad array of the most commonly used measures of value shows stocks to be selling at or above the levels at the 2007 market peak and all other market highs throughout U.S. history but for the 2000 fantasy level from which prices were more than cut in half over the next two and a half years. The valuation work of such renowned market historians as Nobel Prize winner Robert Shiller, John Hussman and Jeremy Grantham point to probable annualized equity returns over the next 10 to 12 years ranging from negative to positive by very low single digits. Intermittent serious declines are highly probable.

Despite seriously deteriorating economic and corporate conditions, stocks have rallied off the September 29 price lows. In fact, the deteriorating conditions, both here and throughout most of the world, seem to have emboldened stock traders. European and Japanese central bankers remain committed to Quantitative Easing. Negative economic and market conditions appear to have the Federal Reserve afraid to raise short-term interest rates even to a minimal 0.25%. The IMF and others are counseling the Fed to delay any rate rise at least until 2016, some warning of panic in emerging markets with any rate increase. Cherishing the fuel of free money, traders have taken the perverse position that bad news is good news. Some of the recent rally’s strongest days have accompanied the worst economic announcements. Traders apparently value the medicine more than they fear the disease. While there is no way to know how long such a condition can prevail, we can maintain with certainty that it cannot continue indefinitely. Markets are left vulnerable to severe declines–even panics like the 1100 Dow point decline on August 24. The most profound danger is that investors lose confidence in central bankers remaining willing and able to keep market prices elevated. The 50% and 57% stock market declines in the earlier years of this century both unfolded despite aggressive attempts by the Fed to support the economy and markets. The Fed doesn’t always win, and we remain firmly convinced that it’s just a matter of time before investor confidence in the Fed wanes again. For now, however, traders appear ready to celebrate the prospect of more free money, no matter how severe the underlying conditions necessitating such rescue efforts.

Nevertheless, the potential for a more significant near-term market decline has increased. In the U.S., the quality of market rallies over the last several quarters has weakened. Fewer stocks are rising and, at quarter-end, more than half of all U.S. stocks were down more than 20% from their recent highs. Only 37% of common stocks are trading above their individual 200-day moving averages. Trading volume is increasingly concentrated in declining stocks; and the internal characteristics of the current rally are far weaker than those in 2010 and 2011 that both eventually led to new price highs. It looks far less likely that the current rally will see prices move back to earlier highs.

Traditional investment alternatives are similarly not very attractive. Thanks to Fed policy, risk-free returns remain near zero. Investment quality fixed income securities continue to trade near historic low yields. At current levels, a mere 50 basis point rise in rates would create a negative full-year return on a 10-year U.S. Treasury note.

With debt levels as elevated as they are–both here and abroad–severe accidents can happen. Maintaining a portfolio with a traditional asset allocation is a bet that serious accidents will not happen, despite conditions that have historically penalized portfolios. Mission has long believed that a more flexible, strategically allocated portfolio will better protect and grow assets in such a highly uncertain environment.


Worldwide Bear Market? Probably

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My most recent blogs – August 10 and August 11 – highlighted the unprecedented volatility that has characterized the U.S. stock market over the past year. I concluded that “…the potential for a major market collapse increases.”

The market took out a down payment on such a collapse with its 1100 Dow point freefall in the opening minutes of Monday, August 24. The opening hardly marked the end of the excitement, however, as prices rocketed back and forth until the closing bell. In total, there were 17 moves in opposite directions ranging from 100 to 1100 points. On average, the market changed direction every 23 minutes, with each price move averaging 335 points. That action would have constituted a busy quarter, but it unfolded in a single day. High frequency traders must have had a field day.

While that frenetic pace couldn’t continue, even the reduced volatility remained extreme by virtually any other yardstick. Tuesday through Friday, August 25-27, saw 26 additional alternating price moves ranging from 100 to 450 Dow points. For the four-day period, prices moved an average 263 points in alternating directions every 36 minutes. Although volume was the highest in four years, there were probably not a lot of long term investors. Perhaps more long-term investors should have been involved. With equity holdings very close to their maximum levels seen before the perilous market collapses beginning in 2000 and 2007, serious damage to shareholder wealth will unfold if a bear market has in fact begun. Numerous conditions indicate that a bear market has probably begun. The depth and duration remain to be seen.

Substantial publicity attended last week’s “death cross” on the S&P 500, with that index’s 50-day moving average dipping below its 200-day moving average. As always, when such a phenomenon occurs, naysayers emerge to point to instances in which the cross did not predict a severe market decline. What is more important to recognize, however, is that more often than not, such a cross does introduce a significant market decline.

The Dow Jones Industrial Average demonstrated the same pattern a few weeks earlier than did the S&P. Around the world, the picture is convincingly the same. We follow activity in 46 world markets. Every one of them is trading below its 50-day moving average, and only four are trading above their 200-day moving averages. Most world markets show losses for the year-to-date, and their moving averages are declining. Price destruction is widespread.

When U.S. stock markets have risen intermittently over the past year, leadership has come from fewer and fewer stocks. Among operating companies, only 2% to 3% of stocks are trading within 2% of their 52-week highs. On the other hand, more than half of such companies are trading 20% or more below their 52-week highs. Far more issues are reaching 52-week lows than 52-week highs.

For many months, the number of stocks rising relative to the number declining has diminished substantially with the trend accelerating recently. The deterioration started in the small-cap area, graduated to mid-caps and has recently spread to large-caps–a classic pattern leading to a bear market.

A well-respected old saying in the investment industry is that volume confirms price. As indicated earlier, volume picked up markedly on last month’s precipitous price decline. In a process begun more than two years ago, volume going into rising stocks has deteriorated steadily relative to volume going into declining stocks. Over the past few weeks, the cumulative volume total going into declining stocks has surged above the volume going into advancing stocks. As measured by Ned Davis Research since 1981, the S&P 500 has on average declined when that condition has prevailed, and the index has performed an annualized 13.5% worse than when advancing volume has dominated.

The highly respected Lowry Research Corp., providing excellent technical analysis since the 1930s, computes buying power and selling pressure as its primary measures of supply and demand on an intermediate to long-term basis. Its current computation indicates the 6½ year bull market to be in its final phase. Two weeks ago, Lowry’s identified a condition related to buying power and selling pressure that has existed only five other times since the 1930s. All occurred in significant market declines, although two were identified toward the end of those declines and only a few percent above the ultimate bottom. The other three signals were followed by declines of 44%, 40% and 32%. Needless to say, precedent suggests that investors pay attention.

For the past year and a half, the yield on lower quality debt has been rising notably both absolutely and relative to U.S. Treasury securities. That condition has preceded some of history’s most costly equity declines.

The venerable, old Dow Theory issued a bearish signal last month, as both the Dow Industrials and Transports closed beneath their October 2014 lows. And the Elliott Wave, as interpreted by Elliott Wave International, forecasts lows in this country not seen since the 1940’s. For that to be correct, we would almost certainly have to experience a worldwide depression–an outlier call, to say the least.

Technical conditions are by no means alone in raising storm warnings. Worldwide fundamentals are similarly uninspiring. The International Monetary Fund (IMF) and the Organization for Economic Cooperation and Development (OECD) have each continued to drop their forecasts for both US and world GDP growth. They have characterized the growth rates as weak and worsening. Similarly our Federal Open Market Committee has had to drop its domestic GDP growth estimates. There are pronounced growth declines and/or outright weakness in China, Canada, Brazil, Russia, South Africa, Japan, Taiwan, Singapore and South Korea –representing many different parts of the world with very different characteristics. Economic weakness is widespread.

The European Central Bank has recently cut its outlook for inflation and growth for 2015, 2016 and 2017. Those projections were made before the most recent China problems bubbled to the surface. Just last week, ECB head Mario Draghi stressed that renewed downside risks had emerged.

Emerging markets have been increasingly distressed by U.S. dollar strength, by commodity deflation and by China’s surprise devaluation. In an attempt to defend their individual economic wellbeing, a growing number of emerging countries have devalued their currencies. The risk of widespread currency wars is expanding. The Financial Times recently reported that these currency devaluations had failed to stimulate exports and had, in fact, diminished world trade. Because so much of emerging market debt is denominated in U.S. dollars, dollar strength is exacerbating the repayment burden. And that burden will get heavier still when our Federal Reserve eventually begins its interest rate normalization process.

Domestically, corporate earnings are weak and will likely be down in calendar 2015 from 2014. Analysts have for several years been forecasting significant earnings growth for the year ahead. Those forecasts have been far too optimistic, however, and have been ratcheted down progressively as each quarter has drawn near. With S&P 500 GAAP earnings barely up in 2014, earnings by the end of this year will be approximately flat from two years earlier. If stocks were cheap, that might not be a great problem. As we have highlighted in any number of this year’s blogs, quarterly reports and seminars, however, a composite of all major valuation measures shows stocks to be more overvalued than ever before, but for the months surrounding the dot.com peak in 2000. Returns from valuation levels even far below current levels have been substantially below normal over the decades.

As we have written frequently for the better part of the past two decades, debt burdens have grown to unprecedented levels relative to the size of economies throughout the world. The debt problem was a critical ingredient in each of the two 50%-plus market collapses of the past 15 years. Today’s level of debt, far worse than in those earlier instances, raises the risk of extreme market and economic reactions should those debts begin to unravel. It creates the risk that a traditional market decline could turn into something far more severe, especially if investors should lose faith in central bankers’ willingness and ability to keep economies and markets afloat. It is instructive to reflect on the June warning by the Bank for International Settlements (the central bank for the world’s central banks) that central banks are now virtually out of ammunition to deal with either a major market crash or a sudden world downturn.

We find the evidence compelling that a bear market has very likely begun. That does not rule out attempts by markets to rally back toward recent highs, such as today’s 390 Dow point rally, especially given the market’s short-term oversold condition, but it makes it unlikely that further gains will be sustained. The danger looms that a market, economic, political or military event could decimate investor confidence and lead to a persistent, destructive decline.

The primary hope for a more sanguine outcome lies with central bankers. History’s most massive stimulus efforts have supported stock and bond prices for 6 ½ years, with little tolerance for even minimal declines. The IMF is currently calling on the ECB to expand its quantitative easing program, and it recently indicated its belief that Japan may likewise have to expand its program. More than once, the IMF has urged the Fed not to begin interest rate normalization until 2016 at the earliest. This afternoon the Chief Economist at the World Bank warned that an imminent US rate hike could wreck “panic and turmoil” on emerging market countries. That these two world bodies continue to lobby for governmental support after 6½ years of unparalleled stimulus indicates their recognition of perilous underlying conditions throughout the world.

Many still believe that governments remain in control of markets. However, worldwide price declines over the past few months have to call that belief into question. And the two-month loss of more than one-third of the value of Chinese equities despite unprecedented government intervention should be exhibit A demonstrating that traditional investment factors will ultimately overcome even the most egregious governmental interference.

With so many caution flags waving, individual investors, even those with long time horizons, should evaluate carefully how much they want to leave exposed to equity risk. Institutional investors with permanent equity allocations should explore hedging alternatives. With many of the financial crisis’s problems merely papered over, not solved, a bear market in the years ahead could be deep and lengthy. And there might well be no rapid recovery with central bankers’ arrows already having been fired.


Volatility Continues

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Just a quick follow-up to yesterday’s analysis. Written on the weekend, we posted “Volatility Reigns” yesterday. The equity market volatility and indecisiveness profiled in that analysis was dramatically in evidence again yesterday and today.

Before the market opened yesterday, traders celebrated the news that Warren Buffett was making a major purchase of Precision Castparts. The economic news out of China was depressing with both July import and export figures down over 8%. In the perverse world of “bad news is good news,” that increased the likelihood that Chinese authorities would soon introduce even more stimulus. There were also reports that Greece and its creditors were close to agreement on another bailout for that beleaguered country. Oversold from more than a week of declines, stocks powered ahead, the Dow Industrials up by 254 points at the day’s high, closing up 241 points. Internals were likewise strong with advancing stocks outpacing declines by nearly three-to-one on the N.Y. Stock Exchange and by over two-to-one on NASDAQ. The only cautionary note was that volume was light and below the levels of recent weeks.

Overnight, China implicitly acknowledged its weakening economic performance by devaluing its currency by almost 2%. That precipitated selling of stocks throughout Asia and Europe despite rumors being confirmed that Greece and its creditors reached agreement on a massive bailout that may exceed 90 billion euros. Stocks reversed course in this country this morning with the Dow dropping 263 points to its low, then rising a bit to close down 212 points. Volume intensified on the decline.

Volatility continues, not just week-to-week but day-to-day. And governments and central bankers remain the major players.